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Viet Nam has experienced spectacular economic growth over the past decade, in part 
the result of massive foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Although much has been 
written on the impacts of FDI in developing countries, previous studies have generally 
ignored macroeconomic consequences in cost-benefit assessments. These 
macroeconomic aspects can be particularly important in transitional economies like Viet 
Nam, where some of the tools for macroeconomic stabilization may be blunt or 
unavailable. First, capital inflow growth needs to be accommodated by real exchange 
rate appreciation. In dollarized economies like Viet Nam, the nominal exchange rate 
cannot be relied upon to deliver it, so inflation usually results. In these economies, it is 
also difficult for the central bank to conduct open market operations to sterilize large 
capital inflows or mop up excess liquidity. Again, this could feed inflation. The 
combination of a young and inexperienced banking system and an investment-hungry 
state-owned enterprises (SOE) sector only exacerbates the situation, and increases the 
risk of imbalances that could result in crisis.  
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1.   Introduction 
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a key goal of market-oriented policy 
reforms in Viet Nam. The thrust to encourage FDI is rooted in the belief that it can play a 
catalytic role in supporting the process of economic transition, and act as a conduit for 
igniting or revitalizing the private sector. Viet Nam has seen spectacular economic 
growth over the past decade (Table 1). Rapid capital growth is the main reason. Capital 
is drawn into countries like Viet Nam as policies that encourage FDI tend to reduce 
required rates of return. These range from tax holidays to direct subsidies to measures 
designed to increase the security of foreign investment.  
Although much has been written on the role and impacts of FDI in developing countries, 
they have focused on the direct developmental impacts of FDI and generally ignored 
macroeconomic consequences. There are potentially significant macroeconomic 
consequences of capital inflows, especially if they are large and rapid. These 
consequences need to be considered in an overall assessment of the costs and benefits 
of playing host to FDI. They are particularly important to transitional economies like Viet 
Nam, where at least some of the tools of macroeconomic stabilization may be blunt or 
unavailable. So far, macroeconomic consequences have been largely ignored, and this 
paper aims to overcome this limitation. 
The paper is in two parts. First, it examines the trends, determinants, and impacts of FDI, 
and second, it explores issues relating to managing the macroeconomic consequences 
of FDI inflows. The paper is organized in six sections. To provide the setting for part one, 
Section 2 offers an overview of policies relating to FDI, focusing on recent reforms. 
Section 3 maps the trends and patterns of FDI inflows, including source country 
composition, and sectoral and geographical distribution. Evidence relating to the impacts 
of FDI on Viet Nam’s economy is summarized in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the 
macroeconomic consequences of capital inflows. Large FDI inflows can have wide-
ranging consequences on transitional economies, and unless managed capably, can 
result in macroeconomic imbalances and even crises. In dollarized economies in 
particular, where the ability to conduct open-market operations or, more generally, 
implement an independent monetary policy, may be impaired, the result can be a sharp 
rise in inflation. In this section, we also examine what policies are available to transitional 
economies like Viet Nam, where the full complement of macroeconomic tools may not 
be available. A final section concludes. 
2.   Investment Policy 
The opening of the economy to FDI was part of Viet Nam’s “renovation” (doi moi) 
reforms initiated in 1986. The Vietnamese National Assembly passed the first Law on 
FDI on 29  December 1987. The law specified three modes of foreign investor 
participation: (i) business cooperation contracts (BCC), (ii) joint-ventures; and (iii) fully 
foreign-owned ventures. Foreign participation in the fields of oil exploration and 
communications was strictly limited to BCC. In some sectors such as transportation, port 
construction, airport terminals, forestry plantation, tourism, cultural activities, and 
production of explosives, joint-ventures with domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs)  
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was prescribed as the means for foreign entry. Fully foreign-owned ventures were to be 
allowed only under special circumstances primarily relating to policy priorities for 
domestic industrial development.  
The Government provided constitutional guarantees against nationalization of foreign 
affiliates and the revocation of ownership rights of enterprises. The incentives offered to 
foreign investors included exemption from corporate tax for a period of 2 years, 
commencing from the first profitable year, followed by a preferential corporate tax rate of 
between 15% to 25% in priority sectors (as against the standard rate of 32%). Foreign 
investors were permitted to repatriate after tax earnings subject to a 10% withholding tax. 
Overseas remittance of payments for the provision of technology services and 
repayment of principal and interest on loans were freely allowed. The specific emphasis 
on joint ventures with SOE as the prime mode of foreign entry reflected the 
government’s decision to use FDI as a vehicle for industrial transition while ensuring 
state dominance in the economy. However, in 1990, the foreign investment law was 
amended to permit economic organizations in the private sector to engage in joint 
ventures with foreign partners. In 1991, legislation was passed allowing export 
processing sones (EPZs) to be set up, and generous incentives were provided to firms 
involved in the production of goods for export. 
Under the 1996 Law on Foreign Investment, procedures for the approval of investment 
projects were streamlined and fresh investment incentives were granted. The Law gave 
local governments authority to issue licenses for projects, up to specified sizes. For 
investments in so-called priority sectors, the tax holiday period was extended to 8 years, 
after which a rate of 10% applied. A three–tier withholding tax of 5%, 7%, and 10%, 
based on the “priority status” of the investment, was introduced in place of the original 
flat rate of 10%.  
These revisions to the foreign investment law led to a massive influx of FDI, which in 
turn fuelled a growing sense of resentment within Viet Nam. This resentment resulted in 
a number of measures that raised serious concerns in the international investment 
community about Viet Nam’s commitment to promote itself as a new investment center. 
These included a proposal to establish liaison offices of the Government in all foreign 
ventures, the doubling of commercial and residential rents for foreign enterprises and 
expatriate staff, the imposition of a maximum time limit of 3 years on work permits issued 
to foreigners employed in FDI projects, and restrictions on foreign capital participation in 
labor-intensive industries. There is also some evidence that suggests that the foreign 
investment approval process was skewed in favor of key high-tech industries such as 
metallurgy, basic chemicals, machinery, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, electronics, and 
motor vehicles. Notwithstanding the new legislation that permitted domestic private 
enterprises to enter into joint ventures with foreign firms, joint ventures with SOEs 
continued to receive powerful support in senior policy circles as the prime mode of FDI 
entry. 
All of this changed after the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. Policy reforms following the 
economic downturn placed renewed emphasis on FDI promotion. Under an amendment 
to the FDI law in June 2000, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and parties to BCCs 
were given freedom to change the mode of investment, and to split, merge, and  
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consolidate enterprises. Recently, there have been several cases of joint ventures being 
converted into 100% owned FIEs. The three-tier withholding tax on profit transfers was 
reduced to 3%, 5% and 7%. The approval procedure of new investment proposals was 
streamlined, with automatic registration of export-oriented FIEs. Foreign investors were 
allowed to implement so-called “less sensitive” projects (that is, those deemed not to 
have any implications on national defense, cultural, and historical heritage or the natural 
environment) without licensing scrutiny of the Ministry of Planning, provided they are 
export oriented. In April 2003, 100% foreign-owned companies were allowed to become 
shareholding companies (that is, they were allowed to establish joint ventures). The 
implementation of a new Enterprise Law in 2000 permitting greater participation of 
domestic private enterprises in the economy also significantly contributed to improving 
investor confidence in the reform process.  
The 2005 Law on Investment and Law on Enterprises marked a turning point for FDI 
policy in Viet Nam. For the first time, a unified legal and regulatory framework for all 
forms of investors and enterprises, regardless of nationality (foreign vs. domestic) and 
form of ownership (private vs. public) existed. Prior to the introduction of these two laws, 
foreign investors operated under a special framework both for investment and company 
laws. 
The 2005 Law on Investment widens the permissible forms of investment, which now 
include (i)  100% foreign- or domestic-owned private companies; (ii) joint ventures 
between domestic and foreign investors; (iii) business cooperation contracts30, build-
operate-transfer (BOT), and other contractual forms of investment; (iv) purchase of 
shares or capital contributions in view of participating in the management of the 
company; and (v) mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Various forms of FDI entry are thus 
formally allowed, not just greenfield projects. This is a significant change from the regime 
that applied under the former Law on Foreign Investment, which allowed only three 
forms of foreign investment: enterprises with 100% foreign-owned capital, joint ventures 
and business cooperation contracts.  
The decision to allow FDI inflows through M&As under the Law on Investment was 
another critical reform, and Decree 139–2007 on the Law on Enterprises—issued 
September 2007—further clarifies and liberalizes the provisions on M&As. Until then, 
foreign investors (or foreign-owned companies in Viet Nam) were allowed to acquire a 
maximum of 49% of the capital of companies listed on the stock exchange, and a 
maximum of 30% of the capital of unlisted Vietnamese companies. The new M&As 
provisions are thus likely to open a significant new channel for FDI in the coming years 
(UNCTAD 2008).
1 
One central aspect of policy toward FDI has not changed, however, and this relates to 
the certification process. All FDI projects must be formally approved by the 
administration, even if it already satisfies the sector, size, and share of foreign ownership 
requirements. There remains the need for the administration to judge that the proposed 
investment is in Viet Nam’s national interest. In this respect, Viet Nam’s certification 
                                                           
1  Cross-border M&As are an important channel of FDI in a number of countries, amounting to $880 
billion worldwide in 2006, up from $151 billion in 1990. Although most of these deals are between 
developed countries, cross-border M&As in developing Asia reached $79 billion in 2006.  
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regime remains influenced by a planned economy approach rather than one that reflects 
common practice in market economies. 
In sum, it is clear that Viet Nam has progressed a long way in terms of opening up its 
markets to FDI, especially in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. The 2005 Law on 
Investment and Law on Enterprises in particular marked a turning point in terms of FDI 
policy in Viet Nam. For the first time, a unified legal and regulatory framework for all 
forms of investors and enterprises, regardless of nationality or form of ownership was 
introduced. Further reforms to the Law on Investment in 2007 to allow FDI inflows 
through M&As could open up a significant new channel for FDI in the coming years. 
Despite these remarkable achievements on the policy front in improving the investment 
climate, there is still room for improvement. Viet Nam’s approach to investment 
certification in particular illustrates that it still has some way to go before it adopts a full 
market-economy approach toward investment, whereby investors are free to invest in 
whatever project they wish, as long as they comply with existing laws and regulations 
designed to protect the public interest.  
3.   Trends and Patterns of FDI Inflows 
Annual gross FDI inflows to Viet Nam surged from negligible levels in the first half of the 
1980s to an annual average of $780 million in 1990–95 and to $2.6 billion in 1997 (Table 
2). FDI amounted to over a third of gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) and nearly 
10% of GDP during 1995–1997. Prior to the turn of the century, FDI reached its peak in 
1997 of almost $2.6 billion, before a precipitous fall as a result of the Asian financial 
crisis. This downward trend following the Asian financial crisis bottomed out at just below 
$1.3 billion in 2002. Since then there has been a notable recovery, with FDI increasing 
every year.  
The years 2007 and 2008 were incredible ones for FDI in Viet Nam. FDI inflows almost 
tripled in 2007 compared with 2006, reaching $6.7 billion. There are no official statistics 
for 2008 as yet, but indications are that total inflow may have even exceeded the 2007 
level, despite a slowing in the last quarter as a result of the global financial crisis. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2009) estimates that actual inflow may have been 
above $7 billion in 2008.  
3.1   Country Composition of FDI Inflow 
The source country composition of FDI in Viet Nam is much more diversified than in 
many developing economies. This reflects a wider range of investment opportunities 
available in a relatively larger economy (Table 3). Over the years, the relative position of 
ASEAN as a source of investment has declined while the importance of investors from 
other East Asian and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries has grown. During 2000–05 for instance, Northeast Asia and the PRC 
accounted for 44% of total approved investment, with OECD and ASEAN countries 
accounting for 36% and 20%, respectively.  
At the individual country level, the relative position of Singapore, which was the largest  
  6
investor until 1999, has declined (from 16% during 1988–1999 to 12.5% during 2000–
05) and that of Korea and Taipei,China has increased (from 9% to 16%, and 12% to 23%, 
respectively). The long history of investment of these three countries is reflected in 
cumulative terms, as depicted in Figure 1. Japan and Hong Kong, China have also had a 
long-standing interest in Viet Nam. Although investment from mainland China has 
increased rapidly, it is growing from a low base, and has only reached 4% of total 
investment during 2000–05. By 2008, it had become the 13
th largest investor, in 
cumulative terms, and its significance is likely to only increase in the future. 
3.2   Sectoral Distribution of FDI Inflow 
Crude petroleum and gas extraction, and construction and services were the initial areas 
of interest to foreign investors, with the manufacturing sector accounting for less than a 
fifth of total approved projects (Table 4). The relative importance of manufacturing has 
been increasing over the years, however. By 2005, manufacturing accounted for 42% of 
cumulative approved investment in realized projects. During the early years, much of 
FDI in manufacturing was market-seeking, or production catering to the domestic market. 
During 1988–90 for instance, more than 80% of approved projects had export-output 
ratios of less than 50%. From the late 1990s onward, there has been a notable 
compositional shift from domestic market-seeking to efficiency-seeking export-oriented 
production in manufacturing. By 2000, over 70% of approved FIEs in manufacturing had 
export-output ratios of 50% or more, with the majority clustering within the 80–100% 
range. Until recently, most of the export-oriented FDI projects were in garment, footwear, 
furniture and other wood products industries. Over the past 5 years however, 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have begun to invest in assembly activities in the 
electrical and electronics industries.  
The decline in FDI during 1998–2002 was largely confined to non-traded goods sectors 
(construction, in particular), and import competing (domestic market oriented) 
manufacturing. FDI flowing to the export-oriented industries has continued to increase, 
albeit at a slower pace than in the early 1990s. The share of export-oriented projects has 
persistently increased from about 1997. The explanation seems to lie in Viet Nam’s 
strong comparative advantage in international production in labor-intensive production 
and assembly activities. It may also be that export-oriented FIEs are more resilient to 
adverse developments in the domestic policy scene, so long as the trade policy regime 
assures uninterrupted access to imported inputs.  
This pattern started to change around 2006–07, when land and real estate speculation 
started to take hold. An asset bubble was emerging, similar to that in next-door 
Cambodia. This was further fuelled by a government plan announced in July 2007 to 
allow Vietnamese living overseas and expatriates to own real estate on a freehold basis, 
which triggered speculators to buy more property for future resale. 
This change in the sectoral composition of FDI is exemplified by the most recent data. 
Nearly 16% of committed, or registered, FDI in 2008 was related to office and apartment 
building projects, with a further 8.1% for urban area construction and 15% for hotels and 
other tourism-related projects. These shares may underestimate the actual amount of 
FDI being committed to property-related developments, however. For instance, of the  
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eight mega projects that accounted for 75% of total registered FDI, six of these involve a 
large component of property investment. These include Brunei Darussalam’s new urban 
area development in Phu Yen, a Malaysian residential and university complex in Ho Chi 
Minh City, two huge resorts in Ba Ria-Vung Tau and another resort in Kien Giang 
province (FETP 2008). The inflow of investment commitments into labor-intensive 
activities, such as light industry, actually fell in 2008 (EIU 2009). 
3.3   Spatial Distribution of FDI Inflow 
Table 5 presents data on the spatial distribution of approved investment in operational 
projects in Viet Nam. Even though almost all of Viet Nam’s 64 provinces have attracted 
some level of FDI in the past two decades, the distribution across provinces has been 
very unequal. There has been a heavy concentration of projects in the South East 
(mainly the Ho Chi Minh City [HCMC]) and in the Red River Delta (around Hanoi) areas. 
These are the regions with the most developed infrastructure and highest availability of 
relatively skilled labor. These two regions accounted for about 64% and 26% 
respectively of the total cumulative approved investment during 1988–2006. HCMC 
alone accounted for over a fifth of this investment. There has not been any notable 
change in the spatial distribution of FDI over the past two decades. Yet again, there is 
little evidence that the government’s incentive schemes have encouraged foreign 
investors to move to remote regions.  
4.   Direct Impacts of FDI 
FDI has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the process of economic 
transition in Viet Nam. The percent of FIEs to GDP increased from 6.3% in 1995 to 15% 
in 2003, and they accounted for over 20% of the total increment in real GDP between 
these 2 years (see Menon et al. 2006). The share of FIEs in gross industrial production 
increased from 25% in 1995 to 36% in 2003, accounting for over 30% of the total 
increment in gross industrial output between these 2 years (Nguyen Phuong Hoa 2002, 
Le Viet Anh 2002, Pham and Ramstetter 2006, Nguyen Phi Lan 2006, and Vu et al. 
2006). 
The impact of FDI on exports and employment has been widely investigated. Perhaps 
the most visible contribution of FIEs to the Vietnamese economy is in export expansion. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated the contribution of FDI to exports (Schaumburg-
Muller 2003; Parker et al 2005; Nguyen and Xing 2006) as well as to job creation (CIEM 
2004; Mirza and Giroud 2004). The share of FIEs in total non-oil merchandise exports 
increased from 2.5% in 1991 to 30.2% in 2000 and 43.5% in 2005 (Table 6). The role of 
FIEs is especially important in some key export industries, such as footwear, where they 
accounted for over three-quarters of total exports, garments and textiles (35%), and 
electronics and electrical goods (mostly components) (95%). 
4.1   Impact on Productivity Growth 
A consideration central to any assessment of national gains to host countries from FDI is 
the contribution of FIEs to productivity growth in the national economy. FIEs are  
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expected to contribute to productivity growth both directly, through their role as part of 
the domestic economy, and through spillover effects on the performance of domestic 
firms. In the remainder of this section, we undertake a preliminary analysis of the direct 
productivity implications of FIEs in Vietnamese manufacturing using data at the two-digit 
industry level for the 4 years from 2000 to 2004, tabulated from unpublished returns to 
the annual Industrial Census conducted by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO). 
The most widely used indicator of factor productivity is labor productivity, measured as 
valued added per unit of labor input. Growth of labor productivity refers to an increase in 
the value of goods produced by the average worker (or the increased efficiency of the 
average worker). In reality, workers may produce more not only because of an increase 
in efficiency but also because they have more inputs (capital, in particular) to work with. 
Thus, labor productivity growth (LPG) could spuriously capture changes in capital per 
worker as part of measured productivity. Total factor productivity growth (TFPG)—the 
residual output after accounting for growth in all factor inputs—avoids this problem and 
this is our preferred productivity measure. However, it is important to check the 
sensitivity of the results to the use of LPG in place of TFPG, because the former is the 
most widely used indicator of factor productivity. 
A number of studies have examined the technological spillover effects of FDI on labor 
productivity in Viet Nam. Le Thanh Thuy (2005) investigates 29 sectors using industry 
level data for two periods, 1995–1999 and 2000–2002, and finds that while there is 
evidence of spillovers to labor productivity during 1995–1999, this effect became weaker 
during 2000–2002. Nguyen Tue Anh et al (2006) is the first to use firm-level data to 
investigate the FDI spillover effect, and finds that the presence of FDI significantly 
improves the labor productivity of domestic enterprises. 
In Table 7, we present estimates of LPG and TFPG from Menon et al (2006). 
Interestingly there is a sharp contrast in productivity performance of FIEs during 2000–
2003 in terms of the two alternative indicators. LPG of FIEs in total manufacturing 
contracted at a compound rate of 2.4% during this period in a context where LPG of all 
firms remained virtually unchanged. By contrast, TFPG of FIE production increased at a 
compound rate of 2.2% compared with a mere 0.6% increase recorded by pure local 
firms and 1.2% by all firms. At the disaggregate level, FIEs’ contribution to productivity 
improvement is particularly impressive in office, accounting and computing machines 
(11.1%), electrical machinery (9.8%), and other transport equipment (17.9%)—industries 
which have become increasingly export oriented over time. By contrast, in most of the 
domestic-market oriented heavy industries, where FDI participation was encouraged by 
the government at the initial stage of reform, productivity growth in FIEs is either 
negative or near zero. Moreover, in these industries there is no notable difference in 
productivity performance between FIEs and local firms. 
In sum, it is clear that FDI has yielded significant benefits to capital-starved but labor-
abundant economies such as Viet Nam. These benefits include generating a substantial 
amount of employment, exports, and improvements in productivity. As a result, it has 
significantly improved living standards of the current generation. It has also allowed Viet 
Nam to reduce unemployment, and make significant progress in fighting poverty. These 
are the direct, and well documented, impacts of FDI. But what of the indirect effects, in  
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the form of macroeconomic consequences? This is the issue that has been largely 
ignored, and is the subject of the next section. 
5.   Macroeconomic Consequences of Large Capital Inflow 
Should rapid increases in capital be a cause for concern? The answer to this question 
depends on how inflows are used, and how the macroeconomic consequences are 
managed. Both these issues need to be considered in an overall assessment of the 
costs and benefits of playing host to FDI. How inflows are used will be reflected in the 
direct impact of FDI on the economy, such as on exports, employment, and productivity. 
The macroeconomic aspects will not, however, as they are indirect effects, but can be 
particularly significant in transitional economies like Viet  Nam. This is because the 
instruments of macroeconomic stabilization in the form of fiscal and monetary policy may 
be blunt or unavailable. So far, such macroeconomic consequences have been largely 
ignored in cost-benefit assessments of FDI, with studies generally focusing on the direct 
developmental impacts of FDI. 
5.1   FDI and the Current Account 
The most direct macroeconomic impact is reflected in the current account. This is 
essentially balance of payments accounting, but can nevertheless affect macroeconomic 
stability if changes are perceived to be either excessive or unsustainable. When growth 
is fuelled by large capital inflows, there is an intertemporal, or inter-generational trade-off 
involved, from a macroeconomic perspective. That is, by drawing upon the savings of 
foreigners to finance growth at a rate more rapid than that possible with only domestic 
savings, Viet Nam has opted for improved living standards for the current generation 
while leaving future generations to deal with the increased foreign liabilities. As a ratio of 
GDP, these increased foreign liabilities are reflected in deteriorations in the current 
account. In 2008, Viet Nam's current account deficit surpassed $10 billion, representing 
more than 10% of GDP (see Table 1). Thus, growth in capital inflows implies growth in 
current account deficits and foreign liabilities. 
Current account deficits are not inherently bad, nor are current account surpluses 
necessarily good. If the growth in the current account deficit as a share of GDP is viewed 
as unsustainable in the long run, however, then financial markets could respond by 
triggering a financial crisis. A current account deficit viewed as unsustainable would also 
increase the country’s risk premium, and limit its future access to international capital 
markets. This is well known. But what are the other macroeconomic effects of large 
capital inflows? The key factor that we focus on relates to the adjustment process and 
the role of the real exchange rate in particular. 
5.2   FDI and the Real Exchange Rate 
The growth in capital inflows will increase the demand for both tradable and non-tradable 
goods. The demand for non-tradable goods will increase by more than that for tradable 
goods, however. At the initial or pre-inflow relative price between tradable and non-
tradable goods, this increase in demand for non-tradable cannot be fully met. This  
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excess demand will increase the relative price of non-tradable. This results in a real 
exchange rate appreciation. The real exchange rate appreciation is the price mechanism 
at work, and is required to facilitate the transfer of resources from the traded to the non-
traded goods sector, which occurs because of the loss in international competitiveness. 
It also switches consumer expenditure away from non-tradables toward tradables, 
leaving more to be absorbed by the investment requirements associated with the capital 
inflows. A real exchange rate appreciation implies a loss in international competitiveness. 
It can also result in Dutch Disease.  
For instance, in relation to Dutch Disease effects, Lartey (2008a and b) analyzes the 
effects of both the level and share of capital inflows on resource reallocation and real 
exchange rate movements in a small open economy. He demonstrates the trade-off that 
exists between resource reallocation and the degree of real exchange rate appreciation 
required. In particular, the less labor the tradable sector loses to the non-tradable sector, 
the greater is the required appreciation. This result is driven by the share of investment 
accounted for by foreign capital, and suggests that an emerging market economy that 
adopts a production technique that utilizes a greater share of foreign capital relative to 
domestic capital will be more susceptible to Dutch Disease following an increase in 
capital inflows. The results also imply that a policy designed to minimize real exchange 
rate appreciation during episodes of high capital inflow should encompass measures 
aimed at stabilizing prices of non-tradables. 
The extent of the required real exchange rate appreciation is closely related to the 
underlying factors that produce it. If the real appreciation is brought about by inflation 
rather than nominal appreciation, then there will be distributional consequences that may 
run counter to the equity objectives of government. If the required real exchange rate 
appreciation is large, and the nominal exchange rate is rigid or fixed, then a bout of 
hyper-inflation may result. Real appreciations can also interfere with the adjustment 
process in countries that are liberalizing their trade policies, such as Viet Nam, as part of 
its ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), World Trade Organization (WTO), and other 
commitments. Such countries usually undergo an initial phase where the real exchange 
rate depreciates before stabilizing at a rate determined by “fundamentals.” A real 
exchange rate appreciation caused by capital inflows could counteract the adjustment 
process by delaying the supply-response of export-oriented sectors or increase 
adjustment pressures on the import-competing sector by increasing competition.  
In countries with floating exchange rates, much of the adjustment occurs through 
nominal appreciations of the exchange rate. In countries with fixed or preannounced 
nominal exchange rates, the real appreciation occurs through domestic inflation. Most of 
the real exchange rate appreciation in Viet Nam has occurred through spiraling inflation. 
In 2008, inflation is believed to have averaged 20%, although it was running at close to 
30% during some of the year (Table 1). Even in 2007, inflation averaged almost 15%. 
Although Viet Nam is supposed to have a floating exchange rate, it is also a dollarized 
economy. In such economies, the definition of the exchange rate itself may not be 
straight-forward. For instance in the absence of dollarization, the dong/US dollar 
exchange rate would be the benchmark rate, and the most relevant one. The State Bank 
of Viet Nam (SBV) can intervene to influence this rate. But is this exchange rate policy?  
  11
This question is the same as asking, is the dong/dollar rate the relevant definition of the 
exchange rate in Viet Nam? It would be, without dollarization. 
With dollarization, an outcome similar to a fixed-exchange rate case may present itself. 
Because this rate cannot move, it is like a permanently fixed rate; another way of 
describing it would be a "no exchange rate" case, as the rate of exchange cannot 
change. How could such a situation arise? Consider the following. If prices charged by 
exporters to Viet Nam are set in dollars, and the prices of these goods in the domestic 
market are also set in dollars, then movements in the value of the dong/US dollar 
exchange rate will not enter into the pricing decision of imports in the Vietnamese market. 
Similarly, if prices of Viet Nam’s exports are determined in world markets in US dollars, 
movements in the exchange rates described above will not affect prices. In these 
situations, even the term “exchange rate” is a misnomer because trade occurs as if 
without an exchange rate, because there is no exchange of currencies, either notionally 
or physically. 
If the “no exchange rate” definition applies, then adjustment to economic shocks will 
require changes to prices directly because the nominal exchange rate cannot adjust. In 
other words, the pass-through of exchange rate changes to prices of imports will be 
complete, and to prices of exports will be zero.
2  This is the same as assuming that 
traded goods prices are set  in US dollars. In this context, the real exchange rate 
movements required to move the economy back toward equilibrium following an 
economic shock will have to be induced by price changes rather than nominal exchange 
rate changes. This will have to involve changes in the rewards paid to factors of 
production, and it is most likely that wages will have to bear the brunt of this adjustment. 
This is very similar to the textbook case of a small open economy. There are some 
differences however, as a result of widespread dollarization. In dollarized economies, 
prices of a significant portion of non-traded goods may also be set in dollars, unlike in 
other economies. The higher the share of non-traded goods that are priced in dollars, 
the greater will be the rigidity of the real exchange rate to changes in the nominal 
exchange rate. 
In dollarized economies, it is also difficult for the central bank to conduct open market 
operations. The lack of monetary instruments in the form of dong-denominated interest-
bearing assets prevents the SBV from conducting open market operations. Other 
monetary instruments, such as changes to the reserve requirement, which the SBV had 
employed aggressively, were also limited in their effectiveness because dollarization 
allows capital inflows to become part of the money stock while bypassing the financial 
system. Indeed, the origins of the macroeconomic problems that almost reached boiling 
point in mid-2008 can be traced to the inability of the SBV to sterilize the surge of capital 
inflows. As a result, the banking system was flooded with liquidity, fuelling credit growth 
of almost 50% in 2007, which also spilled over into mid-2008. But just when Viet Nam 
appeared on the brink of a crisis, with the asset price bubble about to burst, the global 
financial crisis hit.  
                                                           
2  A1.1 Exchange rate pass-through refers to the degree to which exchange rate changes are reflected in 
the destination currency prices of traded goods. For a detailed discussion on the relationship between 
exchange rates and the prices of internationally traded goods, see Menon (1995, 1996).  
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Indeed, a silver lining from the global growth slowdown, and the associated drop in oil 
and other commodity prices, has been the cooling of an overheated economy, and 
easing of inflationary pressures in Viet Nam. The negative terms-of-trade shock hitting 
Viet Nam also shaved off a significant amount in national income, further cooling growth 
and inflation. Indeed, it was just in June 2008 that the Economist (2008) warned that 
"Vietnam serves as a timely reminder of how quickly inflation can get out of control, and 
the speed with which that can shatter confidence." What we have learned since is that 
the opposite can also be true, and the concern can shift very rapidly from controlling 
inflation to sustaining growth. In fact, the EIU (2009) is forecasting a tremendous drop in 
inflation, to fall to only about 1% in 2009. Despite tighter credit in a slowing global 
economy, FDI inflows remained robust in 2008, but may slow in 2009. Thus, it would 
appear that luck, in the place of macroeconomic policy management, prevented an 
impending financial crisis in Viet Nam in 2008. 
5.3   FDI and the Banking System 
Large capital inflows can also cause problems for countries with weak banks (that is, 
banks with low or negative net worth and a low ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets) or 
poor prudential financial system regulation. Viet Nam has a relatively young and 
inexperienced banking system, coupled with SOEs that appear to be relatively 
unregulated. A young banking system inexperienced in pricing risks but flush with funds 
to be intermediated, combined with SOEs eager to expand investments into real estate, 
financial services, and other non-core activities, was not a healthy combination (Leung 
2008).  
The recent macro-instability, especially that prior to the onset of the global financial crisis, 
has increased the importance of the policy response of government authorities in 
managing the macroeconomic consequences of large capital inflows in Viet Nam (see 
Table 1). A number of factors have limited the capacity to do so: (i) widespread 
dollarization, which limits the capacity to conduct discretionary monetary policy as well 
as using the exchange rate mechanism as a stabilizer; and (ii) the combination of a 
young and inexperienced banking system and investment-hungry SOEs. 
These are long-term challenges that the government will have to address. Given these 
constraints, how should the authorities go about addressing the macroeconomic 
consequences of large capital inflows in the short- to medium-term? Given that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is curtailed by dollarization, the role that fiscal policy will 
need to play is enhanced. By cutting back on fiscal expenditure, the government can 
reduce its reliance on foreign savings to finance investment, and thereby limit the growth 
in the current account deficit. To reduce the pressure on real exchange rate appreciation 
associated with large capital inflows, selective liberalization of the capital account to 
facilitate capital outflows could be pursued. Another medium-term objective would be the 
strengthening the domestic financial system to avoid typical moral hazard problems 
associated with deposit insurance—for example, an increase in lending toward risky 
projects—and consequent financial bubbles. In this respect, we need to look at the 
extent to which the presence of foreign financial institutions in Viet Nam can help or 
hinder the adoption of growth-enhancing monetary policy.  
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6.   Conclusion 
Viet Nam has experienced spectacular economic growth over the past decade, and a lot 
of this has been a result of massive inflows of FDI. Although much has been written on 
the impacts of FDI in developing countries, previous studies have focused on the direct 
developmental impacts and generally ignored macroeconomic consequences in cost-
benefit assessments. There are potentially significant macroeconomic consequences of 
capital inflows that need to be considered, especially if such flows are large and rapid. 
These macroeconomic aspects can be particularly important in transitional economies 
like Viet Nam, where at least some of the instruments of macroeconomic stabilization 
may be blunt or unavailable. 
First, growth in capital inflows needs to be accommodated by real exchange rate 
appreciations to facilitate the transfer of resources from the non-tradable to tradable 
sector. In dollarized economies like Viet Nam, the nominal exchange rate cannot be 
relied upon to deliver most of the real exchange rate appreciation required. Thus, 
inflation is usually the result. In dollarized economies, it is also difficult for the central 
bank to conduct open market operations. The lack of monetary instruments in the form of 
dong-denominated interest-bearing assets limits the capacity of the SBV to sterilize large 
capital inflows, or mop-up excess liquidity. Again, this could add to inflation. The 
combination of a young and inexperienced banking system and investment-hungry 
SOEs only exacerbates the situation, and increases the risk of imbalances that can 
result in crisis. This time, however, it appears that the global financial crisis arrived at a 
critically important time, to cool down the Vietnamese economy, and prevent a hard-
landing associated with a bursting of a speculative asset price bubble. Relying on luck 
however, is not a good way to go about macroeconomic stabilization.  
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Table 3: Source of Country Composition of FDI Inflows, 1988–2005 
1988–1999 2000–05   
Source 
country/region 








        
OECD countries
1  848 30.6  741 36.1 
   Australia   92  3.0  23  4.8 
   Belgium  12  0.1  13  0.2 
   Canada   34  0.6  20  0.4 
   Denmark  6  0.1  27  0.9 
   France  149  5.8  15  0.3 
   Germany  35  0.6  36  0.9 
   Italy      …  0.0 21  0.4 
   Japan  270  9.1  330  19.6 
   Luxembourg          …  0.0 15  5.8 
   Netherlands  39  1.6  23  10.2 
   Norway  7  0.1  7  0.1 
   Sweden  9  1.0  2  0.2 
   Switzerland  30  1.7  3  0.4 
   United Kingdom  37  3.2  31  0.5 
   United States  108  3.5  157  1.0 
   Other  20  0.3  18  1.5 
        
European Transition 
economies  79 4.4  …  … 
   Russia  62  4.1  …  … 
   Czech Rep.  5  0.1  …  … 
        
ASEAN 495  23.2  309  19.8 
   Lao PDR  4  0.0  3  0.1 
   Thailand  126  2.9  4  2.8 
   Brunei Darussalam      15  0.2 
   Indonesia   18  0.9  13  0.9 
   Malaysia   80  3.0  104  3.2 
   Philippines   27  0.6  3  0.0 
   Singapore   238  15.8  165  12.5 
        
Northeast Asia and 
People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) 
1118 31.0  2085 43.7 
   PRC  88  0.4  269  4.4 
   Taipei,China  458  12.4  964  22.8 
   Korea, Rep. of  266  8.5  798  15.7 
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Table 3 continued 
1988–1999 2000–05   
Source 
country/region 









2  260 10.7  95  0.4 
      
TOTAL 2800  100.0  3230  100.0 
      $ million    37088    13930 
 
Notes: 
1   OECD, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. 
2   Predominantly tax-haven islands. 
… Data not available. 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Planning and Investment, Hanoi. 
 
 
Table 4: Sectoral Distribution of Cumulative Approved Investment
1 (%) 
 
Accumulatively Implemented FDI in Viet Nam by industry  (effective projects only) 
  1991 1995 2000 2005 
Primary production  50.64 27.93 16.36 25.74 
Crude  oil  45.21 24.10 10.51 19.80 
Agriculture and forestry  5.43 3.82 5.85 5.93 
      
Manufacturing Industry  15.66 33.66 49.01 41.93 
Food stuff  3.41  18.17  23.85  6.77 
Seafood 1.77  10.21 14.90  0.56 
Textile, clothing, and footwear  2.18 0.52 0.74  11.23 
Other 8.30  4.77 9.53  23.38 
      
Construction  … 3.26  4.69  16.74 
New residential parks  …  …  …  8.31 
New  cities  … … …  0.18 
Office-buildings  … … …  6.36 
Export processing zone & 
Industrial Zone infrastructure 
construction 
… … …  1.88  
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Table 4 continued 
Accumulatively Implemented FDI in Viet Nam by industry  (effective projects only) 
  1991 1995 2000 2005 
Service 
20.99 26.44 18.86 15.59 
Transportation & 
Telecommunication  10.12  7.10 4.67 2.65 
Hotels/tourism 7.60 12.18 9.69  8.37 
Finance-banking 2.77 4.93 2.48 2.30 
Cultural-health-education 0.03 0.03 0.15 1.02 
Others  0.46 2.21 1.87 1.27 
      
Total  100 100 100 100 
$ million  361  6,269  14,954  27,986 
 
Notes: 
1   Figures for a given year show the cumulative approved investment since 1988. The data cover realized projects only. 
… Data not available. 
    Source: Compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Planning and Investment, Hanoi.  
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Table 5: Provincial Distribution of FDI Projects, 1988-2006 











Red River Delta  1781  21.5  20241  25.9  1.11 
Hanoi (949)  (11.5)  (12561) (16.1)  (3.90) 
Hai Phong  (266)  (3.2)  (2648)  (3.4)  (1.47) 
Other (566)  (6.9)  (5031)  (6.4)  (0.38) 
North-East 358  4.3 2445 3.1  0.26 
North-West 27  0.3 115 0.2  0.04 
North Central Coast  125 1.5  1473  1.9  0.14 
South Central 
Coast  349 4.2  5276  6.7  0.74 
Central Highlands  113  1.4  1041  1.3  0.21 
South-East 5126  62.0 42337 54.1  3.07 
Binh Duong  (1315)  (15.9)  (6700)  (8.6)  (6.95) 
Dong Nai  (870)  (10.5)  (10410) (13.3)  (4.70) 
Ho Chi Minh City  (2504)  (30.3) (17896) (22.9)  (2.93) 
Other (437)  (5.3)  (7332)  (9.4)  (1.62) 
Mekong River Delta  334  4.0  2315  3.0  0.13 
 















Table 6: Export Performance of Foreign-Invested Enterprises 
  Exports of FIEs, $ million  FIE share in… 
Year Total  Crude  oil  Others  Total exports  Share in non-oil 
exports 
          
1991 52  0  52  2.5  2.5 
1992 112  0  112  4.3  4.3 
1993 269  0  269  9.0  9.0 
1994 352  0  352  8.7  8.7 
1995 1473  1033  440  27.0  10.0 
1996 2132  1346  786  29.4  13.3 
1997 3203  1413  1790  34.9  23.0 
1998 3215  1233  1982  34.3  24.4 
1999 4682  2092  2590  40.6  27.4 
2000 6811  3491  3320  47.0  30.2 
2001 6796  3123  3673  45.2  30.9 
2002 7877  3275  4602  47.2  34.3 
2003 10161  3821  6340  50.4 38.8 
2004 14487  5671  8816  54.7 42.3 
2005 17300  7000  10300  56.4 43.5 
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